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A B S T R A C T
A key aspect of the design of any software system is its architecture. One issue for
perpetually designing good and robust architectures is the new security concepts. Many
new applications are running on powerful platforms that have ample rich architecture
models to supportmultiples security techniques and to explicit several security constraints.
The design of an architecture meta-model that considers security connectors is required in
order to ensure a realistic secure assembly and to address the problems of vulnerability
of exchanging data flow. Our research proposes a generic meta-modelling approach called
SMSA (Security Meta-model for Software Architecture) for describing a software system as
a collection of components that interact through security connectors. SMSA metamodel
is modeled as a UML SMSA profile. We exploit UML powerful capacities (meta-models
and models) to define security concepts of SMSA (e.g. security connectors, composite and
domain). A major benefit of UML profile is to the faithful representation of connectors to
support the definition of security connector types explicitly and to support them with the
ability to associate semantic properties. We also provide a set of model transformations
to fit security requirements of a system. These transformations are detailed and validated
with phosphate support system (SAGE) for the company FERPHOS: a case study described
in SMSA. The model is tested and validated with the semantic constraints defined by the
profile using Eclipse 3.1 plug-in in this case study.
c⃝ 2015 Qassim University. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).u
l1. Introduction
Nowdays, modern computer systems and applications are
heterogeneous, connected to Internet and deployed on large
scale machines independently administered, serving people
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anytime and anywhere. Development environments that
support their implementation are unstable (e.g. develop ap-
plications whose heart is independent of volume, users and
devices using adaptive technologies to respond to each case)
and applications must deal with the volatility of resources
sevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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dynamically (e.g. data persistence, data exchanges between het-
erogeneous applications, move data to remote sites, management
of continuous data consistency, interoperability platforms, applica-
tion portability, managing concurrency, openness and security). So,
it may be very useful to provide an appropriate approach
for designing applications taking into account both security
needs and problems, such as Architecture Description Lan-
guage (ADL).
In IT, security is always a major concern and has been well
studied. Earlier works [1] have focused on discovering new
security techniques, whereas more recent studies [2] have
suggested that the security efficiency for the whole system
is actually more important to make our lives safety and
easier. To achieve security efficiency is to put as many system
components in the security mode for communicating and
processing. One issue for perpetually providing new secure
services (e.g. e-commerce and sensitive communications,
etc.) on many distributed devices is the new security aspects.
Running large distributed devices and communicating among
them will need several security mechanisms. Researchers
have proposed various security techniques [2] usually
incorporated too late into an application using ad hoc
solutions. This raises several problems:
• Integration of security mechanisms into a complete
system is difficult and regards as a poor approach because
many security properties emerge from the arrangement of
all almost essential components of an application;
• Failure to address security concerns (e.g. security system
management, user sessions and roles management, etc.)
from employing individual developers without concrete
guidelines for building more stringent and robust applica-
tions;
• The security management applications for e-commerce
and sensitive communications depend on distributed
components and platforms;—Difficulty to meeting service
security because few tools supports for security analysis
and secure system design.
These disadvantages can be tided, if wemanage significant
concerns such as security communication management and
information exchanges between components at architecture
level that must be consistent and correct. Thus an efficient
mechanism is provided making the security requirements
easy to manage and associate with the intelligent design
tool for discovering vulnerability points that require security
techniques and implementation mechanisms between the
components during system design. In this way, we can
effectively SMSA: Security Approach for Model-Driven
Security 3 satisfy security-related requirements and achieve
robust configuration for system success.
In this paper, we propose a Security Meta-model of Soft-
ware Architecture (SMSA) for maintaining architectures co-
herency by preserving consistency of distributed components
throughout a (re) assembly or a (re) configuration. We provide
a new set of common and generic architectural security ele-
ments (domain: which gives a direct support of distribution
components in several geographically remote sites, security
services: which allows a complete a need of security, etc.) and
various security connectors which allows to add semantic de-
tails to architectural security elements and their interactions.These connectors incorporate the required security services
as well as qualitative extensions of those services to provide a
measure of QoS reflecting the evolution security needs of data
stream exchanged between components. Our approach pro-
vides the intelligent detection of possible vulnerability points
between components, and conducts mapping security con-
nectors among them. In this way, our approach can support
easy (re) assembly of components and connectors and robust
configuration for IT applications. Our contribution in this pa-
per includes:
• We define a Security Meta-model of Software Architecture
(SMSA), a software architecture meta-model that takes
into consideration the concept of security separately from
functional components by means of security connectors.
• Weproposemodel transformations for integrating security
connectors.
• We build a UML 2.0 profile for SMSA to define a complete
specification for integrating new concepts of security into
UML.
• We provide full support for supporting the UML 2.0 profile
for SMSA and semantics checking of architectural security
properties.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the security concepts of SMSA software
architecture meta-model. Section 3 details how we propose
model transformations and vulnerability point detection to
include secure connector, which could adopt various security
techniques in one architecture model, to select best security
strategy that guarantees robustness of architecture model.
Section 4 details UML SMSA Profile. Section 5 provides a case
study described in SMSA. Section 6 discusses related work.
Section 7 concludes this paper and gives resources for further
reading.
2. SMSA metamodel
The intention is to include security issue at the architectural
design in a sole approach called Security Software Architec-
ture Meta-model (SMSA) benefits from a precise and common
vocabulary definition for design actors (architects, designers, de-
velopers, integrators and testers). SMSA approach specifies the
abstract architecture of components without implementation
details. They explicitly de- fine interactions between system
components and provide modeling support to help design-
ers to structure and compose the different elements. Obliging
components to communicate via secure connectors has num-
ber of significant benefits including: increasing reusability
(the same component can be used in different environments,
each of them providing specific security techniques (i.e. wa-
termarking technique, DCT-XOR technique, etc.) direct support for
distribution, mobility and connectivity of components. This
approach includes a composition description including de-
pendencies between components and communication rules
and separates a connector’s interface from its security behav-
ior.
Architectural Description Language (ADL) means three
C: Components, Connectors and Configurations [3]. Components
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ware system. The interaction between these components is
encapsulated by the connectors. A configuration corresponds
to components and connectors instantiations. It binds them
together in order to form the complete system. Some ADLs
such as Rapide [4] or Darwin [5], for example, do not clar-
ify the concept of connector. Other ones agree to hierarchi-
cal description of the components. Components can be seen
as white boxes and might contain subcomponents. In some
ADLs such as Rapide, components are considered primarily as
black boxes. In UniCon [6], Wright [7], Acme [8] and MMSA [9]
we can define composite connectors, whereas it’s impossible
in others ADL. In most ADLs we find the following:
– The management of the non-functional concerns of
components is ensured after the definition of the global
architecture and the configuration of the components.
– The management of assembly does not take into ac-
count the vulnerability problems and the management
risks caused by the distributed applications nature, which
makes difficult the employment of security after configur-
ing and deploying the application;
– Few models are able to define new connectors with vari-
ous services that ensure non-functional concerns of com-
ponents (security, communication, conversion, etc.);
– There is no automatic and direct correspondence between
architectures (models) and its corresponding applications
(instances).
Fig. 1 presents a model of the SMSA (Security Software
Architecture Metamodel) approach. SMSA supports number
of architectural elements including components, connectors,
configurations and domains.An important aspect of SMSA architecture is to offer a
container of various components of composite machine and
process in several configurations called domains.
The key role of configurations in SMSA is to abstract
the details of different components and connectors. A
configuration has a name and defined by interfaces (ports and
services).
Components represent the computational elements (Pro-
cess), user interfaces (Presentation) and data stores of a system
(Data). Each component may have an interface with multiple
security services. The interface consists of a set of points of
interactions between the component and the external world
that allow the invocation of services and is attached with se-
curity properties. A component can be primitive or composite.
Connectors represent interactions among components; they
provide the link for architectural designs. SMSA connector
is mainly represented by an interface and a security glue
specification. In principle, the interface shows the necessary
information about the connector, including the service type
that a connector provides (communication, authentication,
integrity and confidentiality). Connectors can be composite
or primitive.
Interfaces in SMSA are first-class entities. They provide con-
nection points among architecture elements. Likewise, they
define how the communication between these elements can
take place. A component/configuration interfaces connection
point is called port and a connector interfaces connection
point is called role and have security services.
2.1. SMSA component
The concept of component is used to represent any element
providing functionality within an application. In other words,
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supported by a component [10]. A component can represent
a complex application that consists of other less complex
applications. It can also be a feature as a simple arithmetic
operation.
In our meta-model we distinguish three types of SMSA
components: Presentation, Process and data which help us to
detect vulnerability points that require consideration of se-
curity. SMSA component is described by two interfaces (pro-
vided and required) and a set of services that are presented in
the form of actions and events.
The component interface (Fig. 1) is the definition of a
set of interaction points between the component and the
external environment; it forms what are known as protocols.
SMSA extends the concept of interface as defined in most
other ADL by a set of security services of different types
(authentication, integrity, and confidentiality). Indeed, a service
can be provided or required by the interface. Provided service
must be implemented by the component that exposes the
interface and required service is required by this component.
The interface of SMSA component describes ports,
through which they communicate. For example, a component
of DATA type may have two ports, one for consultation and one
for the update.
2.2. SMSA connector
The main element of our proposal is the connector, which is
the key communication structure between components. The
semantic connection is not only the exchange of information
or the invocation of component services, but also the proposal
of solutions to address security issues between the business
components in order to avoid changes to system functional-
ity. The connector is a first class entity because he does not
play the traditional simple role related to communication, but
it also includes security insurance of data flows exchanged.
There are two types of connector:
• Communication connector: The communication connector
provides a connection for exchanging information be-
tween business components. We find this type of connec-
tor between two components residing in the same address
space.
• Security connector: The role of the security connector is to
ensure a secured exchange of data between components.
This function applies according to security aspect used
and controlled by the QoS manager. It can parameterize
security services according to sefety needs of components
and the environment in order to ensure proper delivery
of data flow (see Fig. 1). This type of connector connects
tow components that are encapsulated in two different
abstraction spaces (processes, machines, composite).
For example if a manufacturer component provides
important information in a buffer and another component
consumes contents of this buffer. The encryption and
decryption of data is provided by a connector because the two
components are not in the same process.
The SMSA connector also includes two parts: the first is
the visible part: the interface describing the roles of partici-
pants in an interaction. These roles de- fine communicationmodes (synchronous, asynchronous and continuous) and connec-
tion types (e.g. GPRS, WAP, MMS, etc.) connection between
components. The second part is the glue that implements
security mechanisms for communication/exchange of infor-
mation and services for securing and managing QoS of com-
ponents.
A SMSA connector is defined by two interfaces Input/Output
and glue which are represented by three managers: commu-
nications, security and QoS. It manages the data transfer
between components and allows security operations. An in-
terface required/provided of a connector consists of a set of
roles. Each role serves as a point through which the connec-
tor is connected to a component. Thus two components can
be linked by a connector, furthermore two connectors can be
linked together to ensure complex securities. For the connec-
tor, the glue was enriched by a security manager that works
with a service quality manager to ensure the security task.
The security manager is a set of security services that cooper-
ate to achieve security.
2.3. SMSA configuration
An architectural configuration (or just architecture or system)
is a graph that shows how a set of components are connected
to each other via connectors. The graph is obtained by
combining ports of components with roles of connectors that
are suitable to build the application.
The goal is to abstract details of configurations of var-
ious components and connectors (restricting components ac-
cess through interfaces). Configuration has a name and can
have an interface represented by components interfaces pro-
vided/required oriented to/from external environment and a set
of services encapsulated in components. A composite is a unit
of description of a configuration and entity structuring an
application into cooperating components. The composite is
considered as a hierarchy of component types where the
root represents the application. A composite is a set of ma-
chines. Each machine executes a process that composed of
sub components. These elements (Composite,Machine, Process,
and Component) may be very useful to guide the security pro-
cess. In a configuration, SMSA determines two types of con-
nections:
• Attachment: a communication link between a port of a
component and a role of a connector. A component needs
a minimum of a connector to communicate with another
component; however it can use more than one connector
according the complexity of the security task.
• Delegation: a communication link between a port of a prim-
itive component and a component of a composite port of
the same type. An atomic component communicates only
through its extern composite. So, SMSA approach supports
implicit delegation in their configuration.
The particularity of our ADL is that it is dedicated to
the structural description of the architecture at different
hierarchies of abstract spaces via the concept of domain.
2.4. Domain
An important element in our approach is the concept of do-
main. A domain is direct support of distribution. It defines
J O U R N A L O F I N N OVAT I O N I N D I G I TA L E C O S Y S T E M S 2 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 5 5 – 7 0 59Fig. 2 – Deployment metamodel.
the distribution of components in several geographically re-
mote sites. A domain can contain one or more composite and
one or more machines, each with the process in a system. All
components are running in one or more processes (Fig. 2).
To illustrate the concept of the field and the dispersion
of components in composites, machine and processes, we
present an example (Fig. 3) which describes an area with three
composites and three machines. The composite consists of
five components distributed over three processes in two dif-
ferent machines. The other composite, shown in the lower
part, performs all components on three processes, dividing
them into two separate machines. Communications between
its different components, whether in-process, inter-process,
or intermachine [11]. The concept of domain is used in our
approach, which gives us an assembly structure wider than
the composite; it also provides multiple spaces of abstraction.
These areas include them when the components depending
on its location and related to other components. In other
words, the concept of area providing perimeters of coopera-
tion between component and allows the detection of points
that need to take account of security. The concept of domain
at brought much for SMSA, especially in the choice of secu-
rity connectors that allow the consideration of environment’s
constraints when designing the application architecture.
2.5. SMSA connector taxonomy
Several ADLs have been proposed. However, except for
Ren [12] and xADL language [13], most ADLs not support secu-
rity description of architectural elements. In addition, most of
them are not formally defined. Compared the description to
other ADLs [7,14], connectors can be composite or primitive as
well as ensuring security services. Connectors are a descrip-
tion of the communication and the security among compo-
nents.
Connectors in SMSA are first-class entities. The key role
of connectors is to provide secure interactions between com-
ponents. Connectors can be composite or primitive. Fig. 4
presents the Meta-model of our SMSA connector. The Con-
nector is mainly specified by two interfaces and a glue speci-
fication. There are two types of interfaces: input and output.
A glue specification defined three managers: communications,
security and quality of service.
They manage the data transfer and the security among
components. Connector interface required/provided consists
of a set of roles. Each role provides the link between the con-
nector and the component. Consequently two componentsFig. 3 – Example of domain.
Fig. 4 – Description of SMSA connector.
can be linked by a connector, so that two connectors can be
related together to create complex security task. We have also
extended the glue by a security manager which cooperates
with a QoS manager to ensure the security task. This secu-
rity manager is a set of security services that cooperates to
achieve security.
Three types of security aspects can be realized in software
architectures: authentication, confidentiality and integrity.
SMSA approach offers two services. The first one is to
detect possible interaction points that require security. The
second service allows a semantic integration of secure
connectors between insecure components. There are two
types of connectors: communication connectors and security
connectors. Communication connectors are used to link
two components that are encapsulated within a same
process. Security connectors are used to express security
interactions among components. We distinguish three types:
Authentication, Confidentiality and Integrity.
Authentication connector: Typically is installed between two
components have same composite and running on two
60 J O U R N A L O F I N N OVAT I O N I N D I G I TA L E C O S Y S T E M S 2 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 5 5 – 7 0(a) Structure of authentication
connector.
(b) Structure of confidentiality
connector.
(c) Structure of integrity connector. (d) Structure of simple connector.
Fig. 5 – Taxonomy of connectors.different machines. Authentication connector is composed
of three managers: the communication manager, the QoS
manager and the security service manager that proofs the
data subject’s identity and ensures compliance with data
protection.
Confidentiality connector: assure that the information is
shared only among authorized components that share the
same privileges and access rights. Usually is installed be-
tween two components located in two different processes or
between a DATA component and a PRESENTATION/PROCESS
component. This connector involves the implementation of
encryption/decryption service of exchanging data flow.
Integrity connector: Integrity Connector provides fingerprint
services such as MD5 to protect against malicious persons or
software. Usually is installed between two components have
different composites.
Simple connector: Usually is installed between two compo-
nents have the same process at the samemachine. It provides
a link between two components and consist a simple commu-
nication (see Fig. 5).
3. Proposed transformations
Security is a principal consideration when designing, imple-
menting andmanaging communications and information ex-
changes. To meet security of software components, we must
include security considerations at a high level of design. Se-
curity can be considered from different views, e.g. security
on the level of the user presentation interface-GUI, security
on the level of the network and security on the level of the
process level. At the GUI layer, security problems occur when
the presentation component is not enabled for visual sensi-
tive data filters over unknown persons.
Several services attacks that occurs at the network layer,
when a malicious software agents joins the network; it aims
and targets the information identity in such a way that it
will update the flow of data traffic. At the process layer, it ispossible to connect process component with un-trusted data
component. Managing these problems at an architectural
level provides developers with security mechanisms to guide
in security development process.
3.1. Vulnerability point detection
To ease vulnerability point detection and to automatic inte-
grate more accurately a secure connector, we have included
components into processes, processes into machines, ma-
chines into composites and composites into domains and as-
signment of graphical notationwith different colors to each of
them. In this way, SMSA makes the detection of vulnerability
points that requires security easier and automatic. Its visually
identified by different colors assigned to each container types.
Table 1 serves as guide that contains some security directives
for solving the detected vulnerability points. The detection is
done automatically by the checking of the constraints of con-
tainer and colors. For instance, a JAVA component needs to
communicate with SQL DataBase and NoSQL un-trusted data
items, which are a composite running into another machine
of JAVA component. Security connectors can be used to pro-
vide non-functional concerns of these components (e.g. con-
fidentiality and authenticated access right).
3.2. Architectural transformations
Once the vulnerability points are detected the transformation
can be implemented. In order to better support security
design and to better reduce design efforts, we propose a set of
architectural transformations to integrate secure connectors
types with different security strategies and QoS.We start with
a global architecture without secure connectors and then we
include our proposed secure connectors.
Three transformations according components’ container
are proposed to guide designer to securely system at an archi-
tectural level. These transformations are: Confidential connector
at Provided/Required Ports, Integrity connector at Provided/Required
Ports, and Authentication connector at Provided/Required Ports.
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formation place the confidentiality connector between two
components in two different processes or before a data
component at architectural level. The preconditions of the
transformation are the existence of components of differ-
ent processes. Specifically, the confidentiality connector is
required to secure communication only between two com-
ponents to their own confidential properties over an open
networked environment. In order to change the param-
eters of security services to provide adequate quality to
component needs, the QoS manager controls the security
manager in its work at runtime. It’s possible to combine
several connectors which implements hierarchical infor-
mation based encryption.
• Authentication connector at Provided/Required Ports: Several
malicious nodes are present to perform its malicious
activities (e.g. update data identity) at the network
level. If we use same composite that can host both
components between two different machines, then the
interaction point requires the authentication transmission
of data. The preconditions of the transformation are two
components which have different machines for the same
composite.
• Integrity connector at Provided/Required Ports: Various ser-
vices invocations among components of different compos-
ites require integrity properties. It’s possible to place in-
tegrity connector between components that implements
data flow interceptors for fingerprinting and signing. Such
a transformation helps maintain consistency with corre-
sponding composites and contributes to a compliant sys-
tem implementation.
4. SMSA UML profile
The primordial interest of defining a UML 2.0 profile for SMSA
is to represent SMSA concepts using the UML 2.0 notations
and therefore to formally model SMSA software architecture
and for the long run to integrate software architecture in
the framework MDA (Model Driven Architecture), which unifies
all modeling approaches. The use of stereotypes, constraints
and tagged values permit to capture the semantics of SMSAs
architectural concepts. Thus, the advantages provided by the
UML 2.0 profile permit to define a complete specification
to structure SMSA software architecture and to achieve the
mapping of SMSAs architectural concepts into UML 2.0.
We define the security aspects of the SMSA meta-model
using UML 2.0 profile. The UML 2.0 profile provides a rigorous
verification of architectural elements security. Each service
is provided by component (i.e. configuration) and its global
security is provided by UML 2.0 SMSA connectors. We decide
to use the UML standard metamodel in order to profit from its
advantages:
• To profit from the precise semantics of UML notations and its
powerful model abstraction for describingmore stringent and
robust security mechanisms of the entire system;
• To profit from variety of UML tools, Eclipse, NetBeans, this
aims to describe the concepts at the top level and the initial
glossary (for easy communication);Table 1 – Model transformations.
Container Before
transformation
After
transformation
Process
Machine
Composite
• To profit from variety of UML tools, for designing security
properties meet our needs, then composing and deploying
robust services for IT applications;
• To profit from OCL to check the consistency of the SMSA model
with the semantic constraints defined by the profile and
OCL language is useful for architecture revision in case of
inconsistency.
To specify this profile, we adopted the common rules
described in [3]. They define the following technical aspects:
– Identification of the UML subset for the introduction of
new construction;
– Description of stereotypes and tagged values introduced;
– Description semantics of these new buildings;
– Description of usage constraints: constraints are ex-
pressed in OCL; OCL expresses constraints on the known
UML elements (e.g. component, classes, attributes, and
associations). This section is devoted to the technical
definition of UML-profile for SMSAmetamodel. Such a pro-
file includes a set of stereotypes and a set of OCL con-
straints applied on UML2.0 meta-classes. The UML profile
for the SMSA description language is based on four pack-
ages (SMSA components package, SMSA interfaces pack-
age, SMSA security Package, SMSA Composition Package)
detailed as follows:
4.1. SMSA components package
This package provides support to represent the functional
part of component regardless of their environment. The
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Fig. 7 – SMSA interfaces package.
most important concept of this package is the stereotype
SMSA-Component. In SMSA, component is described as a
UML class stereotyped “SMSA-Component” these bodies are
similar to instances of UML component. SMSA component
may provide services through ports connected to the interface
input/output. This component hasmultiple types stereotyped
as “Presentation”, “Process” and “Data” (see Fig. 6).
We have added tagged-values to capture “SMSA-Component”
semantics and to distinguish between component types. We
have also defined the value of each tagged value related to
each component type. The SMSA component must have at
least one interface component. This constraint can be de-
scribed in OCL as follows:
4.2. SMSA interfaces package
In our metamodel, the package interface defines two types
of interfaces: component interface and connector interface which
are extensions of the port class of UML and are stereotypedFig. 8 – SMSA connectors package.
“Component-Interface” and “Connector-Interface”, indicating
that the constraints on the relation-port interface in UML is
not the same in the SMSA metamodel (see Fig. 7).
In SMSA, component interface has a set of Input/output
ports. A UML Port which has multiple interfaces (provided
or required) and supports bidirectional communication,
matches SMSA interfaces. SMSA components interface must
have at least a port stereotyped “Input-Port” or “Output-Port”.
This constraint can be described in OCL as follows:
We distinguish in the metamodel SMSA two types of
interactions points: input port and output port. Each service
required (provided) by a component must be expressed
by input port (output port) of its corresponding required
(provided) services. The class Port of UML represents SMSA
ports in the UML metamodel 2.0 and each one is associated
with a stereotype.
4.3. SMSA security package
4.3.1. SMSA connectors package
Components and connectors in SMSA have the same level of
abstraction and are explicitly defined. Thus, we include in the
UML profile two stereotypes: a stereotype to represent the
concept of component “SMSAComponent” corresponding to
the component class of meta-metamodel and UML stereotype
representing the concept of connector “SMSA-Connector”
corresponding to the meta-class Class UML metamodel (see
Fig. 8).
A security connector is a mediator between two hetero-
geneous components or component and a connector that
does not have same SMSA interface. A UML class, which
has at least two interfaces (provided and required), and class
“Security-Glue” matches SMSA connector. We have added a
tagged-value Security-Type that allows the distinction between
different security connector types.
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be an expression which refers to additional constraints
and restrictions. These constraints are expressed in OCL as
follows:
4.3.2. SMSA connector interface
A connector interface contains a set of roles. They provide
connection points among components. Roles interfaces have
security services that guarantee data securities of the com-
ponent with which they are associated. There are two types
of roles: required role (or InputRole) and provided role (or Out-
putRole). SMSA Role only supports one-way communication.
SMSA role can be used only in one oriented direction (pro-
vided/required).
4.3.3. SMSA security glue
A glue specification define a connector’s behaviour: is a
way in which to receive data on certain roles, secures
them according to three security techniques (authentication,
confidentiality and integrity) and produces on those roles. The
Glue indicates how the behavior of the roles corresponds
to ensure a complete interaction. Likewise, they define
three managers: communication manager, security manager
and QoS manager work together to ensure the interaction
between components. The SMSA glue concept is relative to
the UML Class in which it provides communication between
components, but it remains defining its semantics with the
following OCL constraint:4.3.4. SMSA attachment
Attachments define the link between two roles or between
a provided port (or a required role) and a required role (or
a provided role). A UML assembly connector corresponds to
the SMSA concept Attachment. This constraint is expressed
in OCL as follows:
4.3.5. SMSA delegation
Delegations define the link between ports of the same type
(required/provided) of a component and its container (compos-
ite). Delegation allows of related interface components made
of composite with the interface of this last. This constraint is
expressed in OCL as follows:
4.4. SMSA composition package
In SMSA, there are four types of composition that encapsulate
different architectural elements together: process to compose
components, machine to encapsulate processes, composite to
encapsulate machines and domains to encapsulate composites. We
consider these compositions as special types of UML Class
(Fig. 9).
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4.4.1. SMSA composite
An important aspect of the SMSA architecture is the compos-
ite as graph of components and connectors. As a UML com-
ponent can contain sub-components and sub-classes, the
composite SMSA are mapped to a graph with SMSA machine
following this constraint:
4.4.2. SMSA machine
In our approach, applications are modeled as distributed sys-
tem consisting of a set of computing machines deployed in
different locations in a target environment. On each SMSA
machine, there are several SMSA processes available for com-
puting and several connectors available for communication
and safety. This semantic feature is described in OCL as fol-
lows:
4.4.3. SMSA process
SMSA processes are abstractions that include primitive
components interconnected together by connectors (simple or
secure). Since a UML component can contain subcomponents
and subclasses, SMSA processes are mapped into UML
components with the following constraints:5. Validation industrial case study
5.1. The SAGE system
In our study, our metamodel was used in the process of de-
veloping a phosphate support system (SAGE) for the com-
pany FERPHOS, i.e. PIS (FERPHOS Information System). The SAGE
system covers three activities: human resource management
and pay provider, formations, invoice and finances provider.
The SAGE system is ease management of 300 workers in the
society. Goal of the company FERPHOS security is to allow a
user with known identity and correct access rights to ma-
nipulate the SAGE system. The SAGE system is modeled as
a components diagram in UML 2.0 consisting of four applica-
tions, each application as a components sets. These applica-
tions deployed on different devices in a target environment,
connected by wireless or fixed line communication networks.
Basically, a main component (e.g. Consolidate GUI) receives
its results from a Treatment Consolidate component with
itself receives its data from all database components
(e.g. Consolidate DataBase, personal and human resource DataBase,
Immobilier DataBase, Invoice and Finance DataBase). Simple
connectors are used between those components to exchange
data and informations.
We have proposed a UML diagram corresponding to the
SAGE system illustrated in Fig. 10. Table 2 shows an overview
of the SAGE system in SMSA.
The security goals of the company FERPHOS are summa-
rized as follows:
• Prevention: all of 19 components of the SAGE system
should be compliant with the occurrence of unwanted
security problems.
• Correction: an integrated security management process
and strategies could protect each service of the SAGE
system related to each component.
• Analysis: requirements of security goals should be
analysed with the consideration of FERPHOS-specific
characteristics.
• Detection: identification of vulnerability events during the
design phase or after they are occurred.
5.2. Architecture modelling and transformations
It’s essential to consider security aspects of the company
FERPHOS at a high level of design, the SMSA metamodel is
practically significant as well related to security aspects of
SAGE system. We start with a global architecture without
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Application and services SMSA components types
Process Data Presentation
HR management
GRH_Treat
PGRH_DB
Service:
• HR affectation
• Needs analysis GC_GUI
• Personal selection GT_GUI
• HR planning GF_GUI
• Formation planning
• Time map design
Pay application
Service:
– Payment
Pay_Treat P_GUI
– Salary augmentation
Finance application
Services:
• finance planning F_Treat FC_DB F_GUI
• Cash prediction C_Treat I_DB C_GUI
• Needs analysis I_Treat
• Success/failure analysis I_GUI
Consolidation
Service:
• Finance planning Cs_Treat Cs_DB Cs_GUI
• Cash prediction
• HR planningsecure connectors and then we include our proposed secure
connectors.
Later in Section 5.3 (see Section 5.3), we will illustrate
how our strategy of mapping can be used; we apply it to the
SAGE system. Fig. 10 illustrates the description of the system
using SMSA. Fig. 11, shows the architecture in UML 2.0 after
applying the profile.
The security goals of the company FERPHOS are summa-
rized as follows:– First, the SAGE architecture was modeled using SMSA
using a set of components types (e.g. data, process and
presentation). Each component type belongs to a col-
ors class. For example, in Fig. 11, bleu color can be
used for presentation components: Personal GUI and Pay
GUI respectively. Fig. 10 shows a SAGE domain with
10 machines and 19 components (e.g. in the category
Data we find 4 databases, in the category Process we find
6 components and in the category Presentation we find 9
components);
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ferent applications, processes set deployed into machines,
machines into composites and composites into a SAGE do-
main. Different colors are assigned to each of them related
to container types of the SAGE system. For example, in
Fig. 10, on the top-left, 4 bleu components that run in 4
processes on 4 machines, on the bottom-left, one finds 2
yellow presentations in one processes and a single data in
another process but on the same machine;
– Finally, the designer finishes the encapsulation when all
components are settled, leaving the component architec-
ture as the SAGE domain.
The uses of graphic notations make the detection
of vulnerability points that requires security easier and
automatic. For each container of the SAGE components, if it is
described by different processes, the interaction point among
components requires the confidentiality connector. But if we
use same composite that can host both components, then the
interaction point among components requires authentication
connector. In the context of integrating SMSA connector
types, it is necessary to respect the structural and semantic
features of SMSA that mean for:
• Authentication connector: we integrate the authentication
connector explicitly between two machines in the same
composite.
• Confidentiality connector: we integrate the confidentiality
connector explicitly between two components in two
different processes or before a data component.• Integrity connector: we integrate the integrity connector
explicitly between two composites.
For example, in Fig. 10, authentication connector C1 used
for P1 and P2 respectively. In order to better represent SMSA
connectors with respect of some criteria such as visual clarity,
it is essential to well distinguish between connector types by
colors assigned to each one of them. This is themotivation for
our security sentient integration strategy. The set of security
connectors provided in Table 3 make the 19 SAGE related
components secure.
5.3. SMSA-UML 2.0 visual plug-in
We have implemented the SMSA metamodel in IBM Rational
Software Modeler for Eclipse 3.1. In this section, we show
how we build up a mapping environment, the consideration
for integration SMSA concepts into UML 2.0 and present
the evaluation results for SMSA concepts. With SMSA-
UML mapping environment, the following features may be
performed on the modeled system:
– Checking the structural coherency of a given system and
to validate its semantics with SMSA approach.
– Providing an easy way to describe complex software
architectures in one easy-to-use visual editor and
diagramming facilities.
– Deriving architectural security constraints form security
requirements.
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Container type SAGE elements Connector type
Same process
PRH_DB
Integrity connector
RH_Treat P_Treat
Different processes
P_GUI
Confidentiality connector
P_Treat
Same machine
Different machines
PRH_DB, FC_DB, I_DB
Authentication connector
Cs_Treat
Same composite with different processes
I_GUI
Integrity connector
I_Treat
Different composites
PRH_DB
Authentication connector
Cs_Treat
Different machines, processes and
composites
F_GUI Composition of authentication, confidentiality and integrity
connectors– Implementing most architectural security concepts (data
ports, user defined connectors, structures such as
configurations of complex components and complex
connectors).
– The detection of heterogeneity is done automatically by
checking of the constraints of formats and data type.
– Providing a more suitable representation of security
connectors which are defined at the meta-level (Class
concept of UML 2.0) rather than using a simple attributes
for this purpose.
Fig. 12 shows the final mapped of the SAGE system in
UML 2.0 after applying the profile. The model is tested and
validated with the semantic constraints defined by the profile.
5.4. Comparison and lessons learned
For evaluation of our approach, we designed more compli-
cated systems with/without model transformations (see Sec-
tion 3.2). We have performed these experiments on a Laptop
running Windows 7 (x64) with 6 GB of RAM and i7-2630QM
quadruple coreprocessor (2 GHz). The architect can use our
graphical tool provides to compare the performance and se-
curity risk values for various architectures. We provide easy
and quick access to the required security connectors.
After some performance tests, we concluded that SMSA
UML profile constraints execution gets alarmingly slow when
the system grows in components instances as can be seen in
Table 4. Once this problem was detected, we decided to use
our JAVA implementation to integrate security connectors.
After determination of the components container, the system
integrates required security connectors. This made the
checking time considerably faster by applying each rule
separately. Moreover, the execution time remains constant
at any model size. This experiment enables architects to
gain insights into performance and security tradeoffs in their
architectures.
Our approach currently gives only an answer of vulnera-
bility point’s detection architectures retrieved from structural
contexts. It does not identify the behavior source of vulnera-
bility attacks as the result of a virus.Table 4 – Performance results.
Case 1: Secure electronic transaction system (components size = 4)
OCL rules without model
transformation
Elapsed time: 989 ms
OCL rules with model transformation Elapsed time: 427 ms
Case 2: Secure client/server system (components size = 7)
OCL rules without model
transformation
Elapsed time: 9975 ms
OCL rules with model transformation Elapsed time: 1487 ms
Case 3: Parking access control system (components size = 11)
OCL rules without model
transformation
Elapsed time:
12 613 ms
OCL rules with model transformation Elapsed time: 2613 ms
6. Related work
In modern applications, security is always a major concern
and has been well studied. Earlier works [1] has focused on
improving security on quality development process, whereas
more recent works have suggested that the security strategies
for the whole system is actually more important to generate
more stringent and robust systems [15–18].
A common strategy [7,19–26] to achieve ease security
integration is to use of well-known languages (ADLs, UML)
and a clear separation between functional concerns from
non-functional concerns of a system. We mainly distinguish
two categories of approach: Component-Based Software
Engineering (CBSE) and Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA).
In the first case [7,22,23,20] focus on the static structure of the
system: the software elements are components assembled by
connectors in configurations. Whereas in the second case [25,
23,20,19] focus on the functional structure of the system:
the software elements are functionalities (services) linked by
relations of collaboration or combination.
Modern applications are more and more developed
according to ADL-based development processes [21]. It
proposes security analysis and verification of security
properties (e.g. availability, confidentiality and integrity) early
at architecture level while meeting the system requirements
on the number of components for each service at the design
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ADL without connector, ADL with a set of predefined
connectors and ADL with explicit connector types. Several
ADLs consider connectors as first-class entities such as:
Wright [7], ACME C2 [8], XADL [13], AADL [28], etc. These ADLs
points a major impact on how architecture is practiced and
how components and connectors are reused. In our approach,
we support the definition of security connector types
explicitly and independently of any particular use of them
and to support them with the ability to specialize them in
which system is being used are changing in significant ways.
Most of existing ADLs such as SPT-UML [29], MARTE [24],
Fractal [30], SCA [31], Kmelia [20] and AADL [32] do not support
security description of data flow among components to their
locations during the design phase. In addition, most of them
are not formally defined. However, except for architecture
meta-models proposed by Marcel and al. [33,34] which sup-
port security entities updates and security services at model
level. Another approach, C3 (Component Connector Config-
uration) [27] proposes taxonomy of connectors with better
visual clarity, namely logic-based and physic-based; to au-
tomatic generate physic architecture for each application in-
stance and to fulfil various connections among components.
It supports three levels modeling defined by the OMG [24]. But
this work supports neither security connectors nor security
transformations out.
In [35], authors discussed how to use UML to specify au-
thorization constraints and to specify access control-basedinformations. It can be exploited for generating architectures
instances playing security roles. Nevertheless, since OCL is
an important factor of how analysis security properties of a
system. Basin et al. [36] studied the OCL oriented mapping.
Compared to our work, our approach offers a very high level
modeling and considers several security concepts (e.g. secu-
rity connectors, composite, domain, and service security).
[36] propose a components diagram in UML 2.0 for describ-
ing port types (required or provided) of the system and then
exploit SysML to define data flow direction. Its approach al-
lows a well description of different interfaces, but disagrees
in the more integration of explicit security connectors avail-
able in SMSA. Other approaches [37,38] consider a data flow in
embedded systems with security mechanisms as an impor-
tant feature of how secure system could be. Previous works
done by Menzel et al. [39,40] rely on high-level metamodel to
define service-oriented security intensions such as trust rela-
tionships, identity provisioning, and confidentiality and how
to transform them on UML using a set of stereotypes. This
work not provides security connectors as mediator between
heterogeneous services and does not provides a formal anal-
ysis to validate transformation process. [40] studies various
security problems related to SOA environments and provides
an optimal solution to integrate security at the design time
for SOA applications using Model Driven Development.
Our SMSA Plug-in can be compared with similar archi-
tecture tools, such as AcmeStudio [41], COSABuilder [42] and
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low graphical representation of architectures and automatic
security constraints verification of models using OCL stan-
dard. The use of SMSA-Plugin offers number of advantages
compared to these tools, including:
• The extension of existing UML profiles to include explicit
security aspects such as security connector types. It
enriches profiles with semantic constraints at a high
level of abstraction accurate the generation of robust
configuration;
• The automatic vulnerability point detection that solves all
the problems of security through visual semantic rules
defined on components containers (domain, machine,
composite, and process);
• The component services which violate security properties
filtered at a high level of abstraction, making our
development process easier and robust;
• The visual design of system can be customized to make
it more suitable for particular user security needs and a
particular domain area;
• In summary, from previous comparison, we believe that
is good for electronic commerce system and sensitive
communications) that need to support security mapping,
security policies and QoS management at architecture
level.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a generic metamodel for integrating and
managing security flow-based IT applications on distributed
environments. Our work proposes to integrate security con-
nectors at a high level of design by using distribution concepts
(e.g. domain as a very important components assemblies and con-
figurations). Since security is often to be considered to be one
of the most important concerns for IT applications, we have
designed a transformation strategy from insecure system to
secure system that will minimize the total design costs for
secure communication. We detect vulnerability points of sys-
tem at the architecture level, and define transformation rules
to integrate security connector types for secure system archi-
tecture to make security services co-assemblies.
To profit from the advantages of SMSA including the ex-
plicit definition and support of security connectors, a direct
transformation strategy from SMSA to UML 2.0 in needed. We
define the UML 2.0 profile for SMSA that can be integrated
in MDA. This profile contains a set of stereotypes which all
tagged values and OCL constraints to grantee correct map-
ping of robust systems. Our contributions can be used as
a support to guarantee security aspects for the numerical
resources (DAM: Digital Asset Management) at architectural
level. Such applications handle a wide variety of media, and
communicate with users through various platforms (Smart-
phones, tablets, desktops, laptops, etc.. . . ). SMSA can bring an
effective solution to DAM development. Especially in parts of:
acquisition, processing, distribution and content use. SMSA
provides way to talk objectively about security problems of
media contents. Their security connectors have many im-
portant properties: for instance it improves various securityproperties by managing QoS and reconfiguring connectors at
the execution level.
Our future works will be the integration of security policies
and QoS management and the integration of SMSA profile in
the approach MDA (Model Driven Architecture) to ensure the
automatism of the process of transformation.
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